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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is an appeal from the District Court's denial of Mr. Downing's Motion to Suppress 
filed March 8, 2016 and heard on March 31, 2016. The District Court erred in substantially 
denying Mr. Downing's suppression motion. Specifically, the District Court first erred in ruling 
that the probation officers could detain Mr. Downing because Idaho law has not recognized the 
authority of probation officers to detain any and all persons on the premises when conducting a 
warrantless probation search. The District Court also erred in ruling that the frisk of Mr. 
Downing was justified because there existed no articulable suspicion of officer danger justifying 
the frisk. Lastly, the District Court erred in ruling that Mr. Downing consented to the removal 
from his pocket of an object containing a controlled substance because Mr. Downing consented 
only as the officer was already reaching into his pocket to remove the object. Each one of these 
errors constitutes an ever-growing poisonous tree of illegal searches and seizures, culminating in 
the finding of a controlled substance in Mr. Downing's pocket. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
On October 7, 2015 Mr. Downing was charged with a single felony count of possession 
of a controlled substance. Mr. Downing filed a suppression motion which was denied in 
substantial part by the District Court after a hearing on March 31, 2016. On June 23, 2016 Mr. 
Downing was sentenced to five years' incarceration, with one year fixed. The District Court 
suspended Mr. Downing's term of incarceration and placed Mr. Downing on five years' felony 
probation, including 100 hours of community service, 90 days' discretionary jail time, outpatient 
substance abuse treatment and participation in alcoholics anonymous. 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On the night of October 6, 2015 Ada County Probation and Parole Officers Hurst and 
Severson went to the address of James Cook, a probationer, to conduct a residence verification. 
(Tr., p. 59, L. 13-p. 60, L. 4.) Mr. Cook had waived his Fourth Amendment rights regarding 
searches of his person and premises as a condition of his probation. (Tr., p. 59, L. 21-23.) Mr. 
Downing opened the door to the uniformed Probation and Parole Officers and allowed them to 
enter. (Tr., p. 59, L. 23-p. 60, L. 4.) The Officers spotted Mr. Cook behind a couch and asked 
Mr. Cook and Mr. Downing to sit on a couch in the premises' living room where their hands 
could be seen. (Tr., p. 60, L. 5-8; p. 8, L. 19-p. 9, L. 3.) 
One Probation and Parole Officer stood at the front door with his hand on his firearm 
while the other searched the premises. (Tr., p. 9, L. 8-23; p. 13, L. 7-17.) While the search was 
being conducted Mr. Downing got up from the couch and moved towards the front door of the 
premises, but complied when asked by the probation officers to return to the couch and sit where 
his hands "could be seen". (Tr., p. 63, L. 13-19; p. 11, L. 1-7.) The Probation and Parole Officers 
found a third person and controlled substance paraphernalia in the garage, restrained Mr. Cook, 
and called the Boise Police Department for backup. (Tr., p. 60, L. 15-20.) The Probation and 
Parole Officers described Mr. Cook as visibly under the influence of a controlled substance and 
resistant to being placed in restraints. (Tr., p. 61, L. 8-13.) 
While awaiting backup, Officers Hurst and Severson, without advising Mr. Downing of 
his Miranda rights or restraining him, asked Mr. Downing if he had been smoking in the garage. 
(Tr., p. 63, L. 1-12; p. 12, L. 4-p. 13, L. 1.) Mr. Downing admitted to Officers Hurst and 
Severson that he had been smoking in the garage. (Tr., p. 63, L. 6-7; p. 12, L. 4-12.) 
Officer Holtry of the Boise Police Department arrived and observed Mr. Cook in 
handcuffs and behaving erratically. (Tr., p. 61, L. 15-19.) Officers Hurst and Severson informed 
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Officer Holtry of the situation. (Tr., p. 34, L. 18-22; .) Officer Holtry escorted Mr. Downing 
outside the premises with his hand on Mr. Downing's shoulder. (Tr., p. 14, L. 7-17.) Officer 
Holtry read Mr. Downing his Miranda rights, and Mr. Downing agreed to speak with Officer 
Holtry. (Tr., p. 62, L. 5-12.) 
Officer Holtry then performed a pat down search of Mr. Downing and felt a small object 
in Mr. Downing's pocket. (Tr., p. 62, L. 1-4, 12-15; p. 14, L. 25-p. 16, L. 6 .. ) Mr. Downing 
testified that Officer Holtry contemporaneously began to remove the object from Mr. Downing' s 
pocket as he asked Mr. Downing's permission to do so. (Tr., p. 16, L. 17-p. 17, L. 1.) Mr. 
Downing consented to Officer Holtry's removal of the object because Officer Holtry was already 
in the process of removing it. (Tr., p. 16, L. 22-p. 17, L. 1.) Officer Holtry then asked Mr. 
Downing the nature of the object, and Mr. Downing informed Officer Holtry that it was 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 62, L. 12-15; p. 17, L. 10-16.) 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err in substantially denying Mr. Downing's suppression motion? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Appellate Review 
The standard of review for a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds is one 
of "deference to factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 
449,452, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989) (quoting State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 
949 (Ct. App. 1988) ). The appellate court then engages in free review of whether the 
"constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found." Id. 
B. The District Court Erred in Substantially Denying Mr. Downing's Suppression 
Motion. 
The District Court denied Mr. Downing's suppression motion except as to the statements 
made by Mr. Downing to Officers Hurst and Severson, before Officer Holtry read Mr. Downing 
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his Miranda rights. The District Court's ultimate error lies in failing to suppress the evidence 
found by Officer Holtry in Mr. Downing's pocket. There are several distinct factual nexus which 
will be analyzed separately, each contributing to a large, gnarled, poisonous tree of illegal 
searches and seizures of Mr. Downing. 
1. The District Court Erred in Ruling that the Probation and Parole Officers 
Could Detain Mr. Downing. 
The District Court's first error concerns the detention of Mr. Downing by Officers Hurst 
and Severson. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a seizure occurs when an officer, by 
means of physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen. State 
v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,456 (2004). A warrantless seizure, like the one in this 
case, is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within the bounds of certain special and well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. It is undisputed that Officers Severson and 
Hurst detained Mr. Downing, as they directed him on at least two occasions to sit in a specific 
place where his hands could be seen, and Mr. Downing was directed to return to his seat when he 
got up and moved towards the door. Mr. Downing was thus seized without a warrant, and such 
seizure was lawful only if an exception to the warrant requirement applied. 
Regarding an exception to the warrant requirement, the District Court ruled that "the 
probation officers had the ability to detain for investigation anyone found on the premises who 
were not readily ascertainable residents or occupants." (Tr., p. 65, L. 6-9.) In support, the District 
Court cited Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1982). In that case officers were executing a 
search warrant of the defendant's residence, and upon arrival the defendant was exiting the 
house. Id. at 693. The officers forced the defendant to re-enter the premises and detained him 
while they executed the search warrant. Id. The Supreme Court ruled such detention 
constitutional as part of the execution of a search warrant. Id. at 705. Of "prime importance in 
assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's 
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house for contraband." Id. at 701. The Supreme Court also placed great emphasis on the fact that 
the detention was "was surely less intrusive than the search itself." Id. 
Summers, however, involved a search warrant and the owner of the house subject to such 
warrant; it did not involve a third party at the residence of a probationer. The District Court 
nonetheless ruled that the same interests cited in Summers are protected by extending Summers 
to apply to the detention of a third party during a probation search: "I think the same interests are 
certainly displayed here ... the preventing flight of the occupants, minimizing potential harm for 
law officers ... and facilitating completion of the search." (Tr., p. 64, L. 23.) 
Idaho courts, however, have already declined to extend Summers as the District Court did 
in this case. In State v. Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 155 P .3d 712 (2007), the State sought extension 
of "the reasoning of Summers to hold that an officer acted reasonably in detaining individuals 
leaving the premises of a residence subject to a warrantless probation search." Id. at 915, 155 
P.3d at 716. The State cited a California case, People v. Matelski, 82 Cal. App. 4th 837, 98 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 543 (2000). Id. The Reynolds court expressly declined to apply Summers in the manner 
in which the District Court did in this case: "We therefore need not decide whether the police can 
constitutionally detain individuals found on the premises of a lawful probation search." Id. at 
916, 155 P.3d at 717. 
Other jurisdictions have found that the extension of Summers' rationale to justify 
detention of third parties during otherwise valid probation searches to be an overreach. For 
example, "in the Eastern District of New York, probation officers are not authorized to detain or 
restrain third parties .... Officers are not authorized to restrain third parties during a search." 
Tchirkova v. Kelly, 1998 WL 125542, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1998). Such result is logical, 
because a warrantless probation search is random, not tied to a particularized suspicion of 
criminal activity, and a third party has not waived their rights under the Fourth Amendment. By 
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contrast, when a warrant is obtained, there has been established such a nexus between an 
individual, his premises, and criminal conduct. The Summers court noted this key distinction: "A 
neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being 
violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who 
resided there." 452 U.S. at 701. 
The District Court appeared to give a second justification for Mr. Downing's detention as 
an afterthought, stating that after Officers Severson and Hurst searched the house and found drug 
paraphernalia, they possessed reasonable suspicion of the commission of a crime such that they 
were justified in detaining Mr. Downing for "further investigation." (Tr., p. 65, L. 16-24.) This 
rationale ignores the fact that Mr. Downing had twice been directed to sit down on the couch and 
keep his hands visible, the second time after he stood up and moved towards the door, before the 
Probation and Parole Officers located the drug paraphernalia in the garage. The justification for 
detaining Mr. Downing cannot arise subsequent to his detention; rather, it must be present at the 
outset of the detention. See, e.g., State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 88 P.3d 1226 (Ct. App. 2004) 
( determining whether there existed "reasonable suspicion that would have justified a detention at 
the outset of the encounter."). At the outset of Mr. Downing's detention, the sole basis therefore 
was Mr. Downing's presence at the home the probationer Mr. Cook. 
Absent the prophylaxis of Summers, Mr. Downing was unreasonably detained by 
Officers Severson and Hurst. As such, all evidence and statements obtained subsequent to Mr. 
Downing's unlawful detention constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and is appropriately 
suppressed. See State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235,239, 880 P.2d 265,269 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("Statements made by the defendant as a result of being confronted by the police with the fruits 
of an illegal search constitute the fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible in evidence in a 
criminal prosecution."); State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 (Ct. App. 
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2004) ("If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
the evidence discovered as a result of the warrantless search must be excluded as the fruit of the 
poisonous tree."); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct. App. 2000) 
("Consent to search does not expunge the taint of unlawful police activity where the events are 
irrevocably intertwined."). 
2. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Officer Holtry's Frisk of Mr. 
Downing was Justified on Officer Safety Grounds. 
After suppressing Mr. Downing's statements to Officers Severson and Hurst due to their 
failure to provide Mr. Downing Miranda warnings prior to questioning him (Tr., p. 66, L. 2-11), 
the District Court then ruled that Officer Holtry nonetheless possessed reasonable suspicion 
justifying his frisk of Mr. Downing pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry, 
"an investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which 
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." Id. at 26. The quantity and quality of information necessary to create reasonable 
suspicion for such a "Terry stop" is less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. 325,330 (1990); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 
(2009), but must be more than a mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts considered with objective and 
reasonable inferences that form a basis for particularized suspicion. State v. Sheldon, l 39 Idaho 
980, 983-84, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223-24 (Ct. App. 2003). Particularized suspicion consists of two 
elements: (1) the assessment must be based on a totality of the circumstances, and (2) the 
assessment must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is 
engaged in wrongdoing. See id. at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. An officer may draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the 
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officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319,321, 756 
P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Significantly, a more invasive frisk search "is only justified when, at the moment of the 
frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or to others and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
dispels the officer's belief. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818,203 P.3d at 1217. 
The District Court ruled that Officer Holtry' s reasonable suspicion justifying the frisk of 
Mr. Downing was predicated upon "paraphernalia in the garage which is in plain view of the 
probation officers." (Tr., p. 67, L. 17-18.) The District Court delineated this basis from Mr. 
Downing' s smoking admission: "I do not find that the reasonable suspicion at that point was 
based on Mr. Downing's admissions to the probation officers." (Tr., p. 67, L. 19-21.) Even if 
Officer Holtry had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Downing was engaged in criminal activity, 
reasonable suspicion alone does not justify a frisk for weapons; Officer Holty required reason to 
believe Mr. Downing was armed and dangerous. Recognizing this, the District Court ruled that 
Officer Holtry reasonably frisked Mr. Downing on officer safety grounds, citing "bizarre 
behavior going on" and the potential that Mr. Downing could have had "in his possession a 
weapon that could harm officers under this particular circumstance." (Tr., p. 68, L. 2-p. 69, L. 9.) 
It should be noted that analysis of this ruling should be irrelevant because it flows from 
the poisonous tree of Mr. Downing's initial, illegal detention at the hands of Officers Severson 
and Hurst. Assuming arguendo that Mr. Downing's detention was legal, The District Court's 
rationale with regards to Officer Holty's reasonable suspicion fails because without the properly 
suppressed admission of Mr. Downing, Officer Holtry possessed no reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Downing had engaged in any criminal activity. It is undisputed that the drug paraphernalia 
found by Officers Severson and Hurst was located in the garage, an area of the premises away 
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from Mr. Downing when he opened the door for the probation officers. The only manner in 
which Officer Holtry could have linked Mr. Downing to criminal activity is by learning from 
Officers Hurst and Severson of Mr. Downing's admission to smoking, given without the benefit 
of Miranda warnings. Without the benefit of Mr. Downing's properly suppressed admission, 
there existed no basis upon which Officer Holtry could reasonably suspect Mr. Downing 
engaged in criminal activity. 
Regarding reasonable, articulable suspicion for a frisk for weapons, the District Court's 
rationale yet again fails because Mr. Downing was supremely cooperative. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that any bizarre behavior was solely the conduct of Mr. Cook, who was handcuffed. 
Mr. Downing admitted Officers Severson and Hurst to the residence, sat where Officers 
Severson and Hurst told him to sit with his hands visible as directed, and complied when 
Officers Severson and Hurst directed him to sit back down when Mr. Downing moved towards 
the door. The record is wholly and entirely devoid of a shred of evidence that Mr. Downing was 
non-compliant in any manner, let alone armed and dangerous. 
Mr. Downing's conduct is not dissimilar to that of the defendant in U S. v. Mitchell, 
2003 WL 1690320, March 31, 2003 (10th Cir. 2003). In that case the officer frisked the 
defendant based on the fact that the encounter occurred in a high crime area, and the defendant 
could have been involved in shoplifting. Id. at * 1. The Tenth Circuit ruled the frisk unjustified 
because the defendant, like Mr. Downing in this case, was "polite, cooperative, and non-
threatening." Id. at *2. 
Similarly, in State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars & no/JOO, 136 S.W.3d 
392 (Tex. App. 2004), an officer pulled over a speeding driver at night who had bloodshot eyes 
and a history of marijuana convictions. Id. at 396. The officer made the driver exit the vehicle, at 
which time the officer frisked the driver. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals ruled that the frisk was 
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unjustified, noting that the driver "was entirely cooperative during the traffic stop. Before the 
frisk, he was not nervous or agitated. He had made no sudden movements or furtive gestures. He 
did not try to flee. Although Hullum reasonably suspected that Tobin had used an intoxicant of 
some kind, that alone does not raise a reasonable suspicion that Tobin was armed." Id. at 402. In 
this case there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Downing was nervous or agitated, made 
sudden moves, or tried to flee. Mr. Downing was nothing but cooperative. Perhaps most 
significantly, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that suspicion of intoxication does not alone 
raise suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, so even if Officer Holtry suspected Mr. 
Downing was intoxicated, such suspicion did not justify frisking Mr. Downing. See also People 
v. Francis, 17 Misc. 3d 870, 875, 847 N.Y.S.2d 398,403 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (no justification 
for frisk for weapons where "Defendant never made any furtive movements or threatening 
gestures during the confrontation. He never tried to reach for the knife or conceal it. On the 
contrary, defendant never exhibited any suspicious behavior and was completely cooperative 
with Officer Castro during the encounter.") 
Any person encountered by law enforcement could potentially be armed, but more 
particularized suspicion regarding officer danger and the armed and dangerous nature of a 
suspect is both required and completely absent in this case. There existed no officer safety 
concerns justifying Officer Holtry' s frisk of Mr. Downing. 
3. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Mr. Downing Consented to Officer 
Holtry's Removal of the Object from his Pocket. 
Lastly, the District Court ruled that Mr. Downing consented to Officer Holtry's removal 
of the object from his pocket that turned out to contain a controlled substance: "Mr. Downing has 
been Mirandized and after consenting to talk with the officers, Mr. Downing says yes, its 
methamphetamine. It's in my pocket, and yes, you can take it." (Tr., p. 71, L. 10-13.) 
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Again, analysis of this ruling should be irrelevant because it flows from the poisonous 
tree of Mr. Downing' s initial, illegal detention at the hands of Officers Severson and Hurst and 
Officer Holtry' s lack of justification to conduct a frisk of Mr. Downing. 
Assuming arguendo that Mr. Downing's detention and frisk were legal, the District Court 
erred because Mr. Downing, testified that Officer Holtry had already reached in his pocket when 
he consented to the removal of the object: "[Officer Holtry] asked, 'Do you mind ifl pull this out 
of your pocket,' but he was reaching in at the same time." (Tr., p. 16, L. 18-20.) Mr. Downing 
also testified that Officer Holtry did not ask him the nature of the substance until after Officer 
Holtry "pulled it out." (Tr., p. 17, L. 10-16.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that under Terry, 392 U.S. 1, a 
protective frisk is generally limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing. State v. Crooks, 150 
Idaho 117, 119,244 P.3d 261,263 (Ct. App. 2010) ( "Under Terry, an officer may conduct a 
limited pat-down search, or frisk, of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her 
body in an attempt to find weapons."); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818,203 P.3d at 1217 (same); State 
v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The stop and frisk procedure 
... is defined as 'a carefully limited search of the outer clothing'"); State v. Greene, 140 Idaho 
605, 607, 97 P.3d 472,474 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding a Terry frisk is initially limited to "a frisk of 
the outer clothing"). 
Officer Holtry's act ofreaching into Mr. Downing's pocket without gaining Mr. 
Downing's prior permission expanded the scope of the Terry frisk beyond its permissible bounds 
of a search for weapons limited to outer clothing. Accordingly, the controlled substance removed 
from Mr. Downing's pocket is appropriately suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the District Court erred in substantially denying Mr. 
Downing's suppression motion, and this matter is appropriately remanded for further 
proceedings. 
---Dated this ( 3 day of March, 2017. 
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